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In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Americans flocked to their 
local shopping centers to purchase the latest and greatest consumer goods. Thanks 
to higher wages, the GI Bill, and a booming job market, consumers used their new 
spending power to purchase a wide array of products, including televisions, 
washing machines, refrigerators, toaster ovens, and vacuum cleaners. Among the 
most desired of these postwar products was the latest in bug-killing technology, a 
chemical known as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). The new “miracle 
pesticide,” as some called it, had proven to be an effective tool for the elimination 
of malaria and typhus in the European and Pacific Theaters and consumers were 
eager to get their hands on the insect-killing war hero for use in their homes and 
gardens. In the fall of 1945, lifted wartime restrictions on domestic DDT sales, 
consumers around the country rushed to their local hardware stores and 
supermarkets, where they shopped for a number of DDT-laden products, including 
bug bombs, aerosol sprays, paint, and wallpaper, which featured a myriad of 
designs ranging from Mickey Mouse for the children’s room to floral patterns for 
the living room and dining room. As a 1946 article in the Nebraska Farmer noted, 
“After winning a glorious victory during World War II over the insidious insect 
foes of G. I. Joe, DDT has shucked its military clothes, wrapped up its world-wide 
service bars, and come back home to take over the No. 1 spot in America's bug  
battle.”2    
The bug-killing fervor that thrust DDT into consumer markets in the postwar 
era was a continuation of attitudes that emerged early in the Second World War, 
prior to the existence of DDT. Throughout 1942 and early 1943, Allied forces 
stationed in the South Pacific fell to insect-borne illnesses at an unprecedented rate. 
In November 1943, American troops in New Guinea reported six hundred malaria 
cases for every thousand troops, and by January 1943, four divisions stationed in 
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1 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Riverside Press, 1962). 
2 Keith Carter, “How About D.D.T,” Nebraska Farmer, July 6, 1946, 13.     
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the South Pacific were hospitalized, rendering them unable to fight.3 General 
Douglas MacArthur, frustrated after suffering a defeat at the hands of malaria 
during the Bataan Campaign, became hell-bent on eliminating malaria from his 
ranks. In early 1943, MacArthur initiated a massive malaria prevention program, in 
which he created special mosquito-control units designed to burn and oil mosquito 
vectors, and increased the shipping priority of antimalarial medicines to his 
frontlines. MacArthur’s efforts eventually caught the attention of Congress and 
Major General James Magee, who instructed the Department of War Information 
to begin printing propaganda that warned troops that insects were as much of a 
threat to the Allied forces as the Germans or Japanese.   
 Due to fears that civilians would spread diseases to troops stationed on the 
home front, Magee’s war against bugs also involved convincing American citizens 
to kill bugs. During the peak of the Pacific malaria epidemic, the Department of 
War Information produced hundreds of posters, films, and advertisements that 
likened the annihilation of insects in homes and gardens to victory overseas. These 
propaganda materials featured colorful images that depicted Japanese and Nazi 
soldiers as insects and instructed citizens that the elimination of both pests was 
necessary to win the war.4 The messages from Magee’s propaganda campaign 
eventually made their way into the popular press, resulting in newspapers and 
magazines around the country calling for the annihilation of bugs for the sake of 
national security. Publications such as Better Homes and Gardens and Science 
Newsletter ran countless stories informing citizens on the most effective strategies 
for eliminating “insect saboteurs” from victory gardens and warned Americans to 
“shoot to kill” if they saw a bug in their home.5 Both the propaganda from the 
Department of War Information and the popular press’s depictions of insects as 
enemy forces created a sense of urgency to eliminate mosquitoes on the home front 
and conveyed to the general public that killing bugs was as patriotic as working in 
a bomber factory or buying war bonds.    
When the war concluded in fall 1945, the war on bugs did not abate, but 
rather, intensified. However, this new phase of the war did not involve killing bugs 
in order to defeat Nazis or Japanese. Instead, it was a campaign against a new 
enemy: insects that threatened the American family. During the war, the popular 
press informed citizens that killing bugs was tantamount to ridding the world of 
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4 Office for Emergency Management, Office of War Information, “Enemies Both! It’s your Job 
to Help Eliminate them,”1943. The National Archives at College Park, College Park. 
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5 “Insect Saboteurs,” The Science News-Letter, October 9, 1943, 238.   
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disease, and Americans began to envision the postwar years as a future without 
insect-borne illness. There would be no more mosquitoes to cause malaria, or fleas 
to spread typhus; the United States would be a safe environment to raise a family 
without fear of contracting a deadly or debilitating illness. The military’s adoption 
of a new pesticide known as DDT made this world easier for citizens to imagine. 
Americans began reading about DDT after the chemical halted a typhus epidemic 
in Naples, Italy during the winter of 1943-1944 and newspapers promised that this 
new pesticide would end disease once and for all. DDT, Americans were told, was 
highly effective at killing insects, was cheap to produce, and had the added bonus 
of being non-toxic to humans and their pets. The chemical appeared to be the 
perfect weapon for protecting the sanctity of the new suburban household.   
Pesticide companies played a large role in spreading this message. 
Companies like DuPont and Hercules garnered enormous profits from DDT 
production through military contracts in 1943 and desired to continue lining their 
pockets through domestic sales in the postwar years. Advertisers for these 
companies continued pushing the wartime message that killing bugs was essential 
to public safety and called on citizens to conduct a “total war” on insects in their 
front yards and suburban homes. Pesticide marketers introduced colorful 
advertisements that portrayed soldiers fighting bugs on the frontlines, used the 
growing medium of television to depict suburban women applying DDT to cribs 
and screen doors, and came out with easy-to-use consumer products like DDT 
paint and stick-on wallpaper. The marketing campaign proved highly effective, 
ensuring that the sense of enmity toward bugs did not subside in the postwar years, 
and masking a growing number of reports from entomologists warning of DDT’s 
potential dangers—reports that eventually made their way into Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring. The stage was set for one of the largest ecological disasters of the 
twentieth century. 
The purpose of this essay is to trace the origins and consequences of 
America’s obsession with killing insects during and after the Second World War. It 
begins by examining the connection between the malaria epidemic in the South 
Pacific and the heightened sense of urgency on the home front to eliminate bugs. 
The essay then proceeds to detail the development of DDT, its uses during the war, 
and depictions of the chemical within the popular press, which sparked enormous 
demand for the pesticide among American citizens. This essay then turns to the 
postwar era, when consumers finally gained access to DDT and the battle against 
insects hit a deadly peak. This section covers the role of the pesticide industry in 
promoting the idea that insects were a danger to human safety and examines how 
the corporations’ marketing strategies carried the wartime determination to 
eliminate insects into the postwar era. By examining DDT’s transition from a 
weapon of the United States military to a consumer product in the mid-1940s, this 
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essay argues that the Second World War and the postwar era constituted a war 
against insects, in which Americans viewed killing bugs as essential to the 
preservation of national security and human health. These tensions between insects 
and humans persisted until 1962, when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
demonstrated to Americans citizens and pubic officials that insects were necessary 
to the balance of nature and subsequently human health. 
 
DDT and WWII 
 
Early in the war, American field commanders stationed throughout the South 
Pacific realized they had underestimated the destructive power of mosquito-borne 
illness. The Surgeon General’s Office had urged commanders to take efforts to 
drain stagnant water and burn mosquito vectors, but health officials lacked the 
authority to enforce these measures, resulting in most commanders ignoring the 
requests. One stubborn South Pacific commander berated a health official and told 
him that malarial prevention was a distraction, and that they were there “to kill 
Japs, and to hell with mosquitoes.”6 Disregarding these recommendations proved to 
be a deadly mistake. At the time of their surrender at Bataan on April 9, 1942, 
Filipino-American forces reported over 24,000 current cases of malaria, with sixty-
five percent of total troops stationed in the Philippines having undergone treatment 
for malaria within the past four months.7 General Robert L. Eichelberger stationed 
in Buna at the time of the epidemic commented on the destructive power of malaria 
on Allied forces. “Disease was a surer and more deadly peril to us than enemy 
marksmanship,” he recalled, “we had to whip the Japanese before the malarial 
mosquitos whipped us.”8 Douglas MacArthur echoed these sentiments in 1942 
after his troops fell to malaria at a high rate during the Bataan campaign. “Doctor,” 
he complained to health official P.F. Russell, “this will be a long war if every 
division I have facing the enemy I must count on a second division in the hospital 
with malaria and a third division convalescing from this debilitating disease!”9   
By the end of 1942, five times as many troops had died from malaria than at 
the hands of Japanese forces, leaving commanders and health officials frantically 
searching for an immediate solution to the mosquito problem.10 In early 1943, 
                                                
6 P.F. Russell, Introduction to Preventive Medicine in World War II VI, ed. Colonel John Boyd 
Coates, Jr. (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General Department of the Army, 1963), 9.   
7 James Gillespie, “Malaria and the Defense of Bataan,” in Preventive Medicine in World War II, 
503.   
8 Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York: Viking Press, 1950), 43.   
9 P.F. Russell, Introduction, 3.   
10 Judith A. Bennett, Natives and Exotics: World War II and Environment in the Southern Pacific 
(Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), 50.   
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MacArthur, frustrated after suffering heavy malaria casualties in Bataan and Papua, 
took measures to ensure that he would not suffer another defeat to mosquito 
soldiers. MacArthur increased the shipping priority of anti-malaria supplies, 
ordered his commanders to drain mosquito-infested swamps, and instructed 
soldiers to take preventive medicines.11 Army Surgeon General James C. Magee 
also gained traction for the war against bugs. In January 1943, the same month 
MacArthur began his crusade against mosquitoes, Congress gave Magee 
permission to create special antimalarial units for deployment overseas. These units 
included teams of malariaologists, entomologists, and parasitologists to research 
the disease on military bases, and mosquito control units, which contained a 
sanitary engineer, and eleven enlisted men with specialized training in malaria 
prevention.12 Magee’s bug-fighting initiative also included a massive educational 
program, designed to prevent the spread of malaria among the civilian population 
and soldiers returning from the Pacific. Within ration containers, manuals, and 
matchbooks, the Department of War Information printed hundreds of propaganda 
images that called mosquitoes “Public Enemy #1,” while various educational films 
and radio broadcasts charged soldiers to take precautions against malaria by 
draining stagnant ponds and wearing mosquito repellent.13 “Don’t be a dummy,” a 
1943 Office of War Information advertisement exclaimed, “Avoid Malaria!”14   
One of the consequences of Magee’s propaganda campaign and the malaria 
epidemic in the Pacific was a heightened sense of urgency to kill insects on the 
home front. As newspapers and popular magazines instructed citizens to ration 
gasoline and purchase war bonds, they also emulated public health propaganda, 
calling on Americans to destroy any insects that had the potential to harm the war 
effort. An article in the Sunday Morning Star from April 25, 1943 warned 
Americans that their “victory gardens are sure to be invaded by insect enemies” 
and that planters “must be prepared to fight” by any means necessary.15 A Science 
Newsletter article singled out the Japanese beetle and the Hessian fly, an 
                                                
11 Robert J.T. Joy, “Malaria in American Troops in the South and Southwest Pacific in World 
War II, Medical History 43 (1999): 199-200.   
12 Oliver R. McCoy, “War Department Provisions for Malaria Control,” in Preventive Medicine 
in World War II VI, 15-16.   
13 Public Health Service, “Criminal At Large” (United States Office of Malaria Control, 1943), 
MPEG video, 12:59, https://ia800502.us.archive.org/35/items/CriminalAtLarge1943/Criminal-
AtLarge1943_512kb.mp4.  
14 Office for Emergency Management, Office of War Information, “Don’t be a dummy, Avoid 
Malaria!,” 1943. The National Archives at College Park, College Park, 
https://research.archives.gov/id/514128.   
15 “Insects Threaten Attack on Victory Garden Plants,” The Sunday Morning Star, April 25, 
1943, 12. 
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Arthropoda originating from Asia, as “insect saboteurs” that aided the enemy by 
destroying American victory gardens and agricultural fields. 16  The author 
concluded that citizens needed to take greater efforts to annihilate the “insect 
enemies” or American food supplies would dwindle. Other publications used racist 
rhetoric to connect fighting insects and to killing enemy soldiers. A Life magazine 
author referred to the Japanese beetle as the “Jap” beetle and attempted to draw 
similarities between the Japanese people and the insect:    
 
Japanese beetles, unlike the Japanese, are without guile. There are, 
however, many parallels between the two. Both are small but very 
numerous and prolific, as well as voracious, greedy, and devouring. 
Both have single-track minds. Both are inscrutable, the beetles 
particularly.17   
   
The solution to the bug problem, all the authors agreed, was to purchase and 
stockpile large quantities of pesticides to fight against the insect invaders. As the 
author of a victory garden manual published in the New York Times bluntly 
remarked, it would be a mistake “not to have a private drug store in your garage, 
stocked with Bordeaux mixture, lead arsenate, rotenone, pyrethrum, tobacco dust, 
tobacco juice, fine Sulphur, and Mex.”18     
While popular publications assisted the military in spreading the message to 
eliminate insects for the war effort and national security, pesticide companies also 
joined in on the bug-killing fervor. In 1943, several chemical companies launched 
publicity campaigns designed to profit off the urgency to eliminate pests on the 
home front and ensure that Americans picked their products over those of their 
competitors. FLIT, a trademark of Standard Oil, created a number of different 
advertisements that attempted to push citizens to purchase their products by 
demonstrating how their pesticides were saving lives overseas. For example, a 
FLIT advertisement from 1943 reads, “Our soldiers are sure glad to get FLIT… 
They’re real weapons of war on many insect infected battle-fronts.”19 The ad drives 
home this insect-killing message with an image depicting a soldier writing a letter 
behind a barricade made out of boxes labeled FLIT, which separates him from 
                                                
16 “Insect Saboteurs,” The Science News-Letter, October 9, 1943, 238. 
17Anthony Standen, “Japanese Beetle,” Life, July 17, 1944, 39.    
18 L.H. Robbins, “Joe and Jane Novice: Are Sophomores Now,” New York Times, March 21, 
1943, 14.  
19 FLIT, “Honest, mom,” advertisement, May 7, 1943 in Georges Teyssot, ed., The American 
Lawn (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999), 140.   
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mosquitoes with Japanese flags on their wings. “Honest, Mom,” the ad concludes, 
“If the FLIT hadn’t come we would have been eaten alive!”20   
FLIT also employed the expertise of rising cartoonist Theodor “Dr. Seuss” 
Geisel to help sell their products to civilians. Although Geisel had begun working 
for FLIT during the 1920s, his “Quick, Henry, The Flit!” and “Swat the Fly!” 
campaigns, which became popular slogans during the 1940s, evolved to include 
war-related imagery, with his cartoons depicting soldiers fighting insects in tanks 
or squashing bugs under their military boots. Geisel’s 1943 cartoons contributed 
greatly to spreading the message that bugs were bad and that destroying them with 
pesticides was essential to victory on the frontlines and at home. As one historian 
has noted, through Geisel’s cartoons “the public grew comfortable with the myth 
that pesticides were absolutely necessary” for an Allied victory.21   
Citizens reacted to these calls to arms by purchasing large quantities of 
insecticides and taking greater measures to eliminate bugs from their homes and 
gardens. Arsenic, the consumers’ preferred choice due to its lethal potency, left the 
shelves at an unprecedented rate. In 1943, the War Production Board recorded the 
domestic sale of 51,235 short tons of arsenic, marking an over twenty percent 
increase from the previous year’s sale of just over 40,000 short tons.22 Arsenic 
based pesticides such as Paris Green reported the domestic sale of 2,265 short tons, 
while the Shepherd Chemical Company recorded a sale of 45,352 short tons of 
their lead arsenate insecticides, a record-breaking number for the Cincinnati based 
company.23 When domestic arsenic sales outstripped production in early 1944, 
Americans had to adopt other strategies to destroy insects. Nebraska farmer Diena 
Thieszen Schmidt recalled the frustrations she felt after “army bugs” invaded her 
fields when her family was unable to acquire enough arsenic to eliminate the 
invaders. “We did everything we could think of,” she noted. “We made noises at 
the end of the field. We set up smoke pots. We tried everything to try to get rid of 
those army bugs.” 24  For Thieszen and the estimated twenty million victory 
gardeners on the home front, killing insects, even without pesticides, became vital 
to their participation in the war effort.25      
                                                
20 FLIT, “Honest, mom,” 140.   
21 Will Allen, The War on Bugs (White River Juncture, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 
2007), 114. 
22 Allan Matthews and Louise R. Bryson, “Arsenic,” in Minerals Yearbook, 1945, ed. E. 
W. Pehrson and H.D. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 753.  
23 Allan, “Arsenic,” 753.   
24 Transcript, Diena Schmidt, “Fighting Pests,” interview by Bill Ganzel, Living History Farm: 
http://www.livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe40s/pests_01.html. 
25 Joy Aschenbach, “Victory Gardens that Sprouted in Wartime Still Feed the Body and Soul,” 
Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1992. 
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While the war on bugs was underway on American soil, back in the Pacific 
military planners hit a significant roadblock regarding the supply of preventive 
medicine and pesticides for the troops. Prior to the war, the United States had 
relied on Japanese supplies of chrysanthemum cinerariifolium flowers to produce 
an early insecticide known as pyrethrum. After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, these 
supplies dwindled as the Japanese cut off exports to the United States, which left 
the War Department reliant on smaller pyrethrum reserves from Kenya.26 Quinine, 
one of the oldest antimalarial compounds, was also hard to secure. In spring 1942, 
Japanese forces annexed the East Indies, including the island of Java, where the 
United States acquired the bulk of its quinine supplies. The War Department, 
however, had anticipated the quinine shortage before the war and stockpiled 
supplies of a preventive medicine known as Atabrine, which German troops first 
employed during the First World War.27   
Despite larger supplies, Atabrine did not provide an immediate remedy to the 
mosquito problem. Like the commanders in the Pacific who ignored public health 
officials early in the war, many soldiers ignored orders to take the medication 
because of its adverse side effects. Troops reported that after taking their 100mg 
tablet, they experienced diarrhea, vomiting, cramps, and yellowing of the eyes and 
skin, which made them “appear Japanese.” 28  Instead of dealing with these 
debilitating effects, troops often hid the tablets under their mattresses, leaving 
soldiers susceptible to malaria despite the control efforts. 29  With Atabrine’s 
effectiveness still questionable and other preventive medicines and pesticides held 
hostage by the Japanese, the U.S. military looked for a better solution to the bug 
problem.   
To the relief of scientists working in the military’s Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, who frantically tested every chemical they could find 
in order to discover a suitable alternative to quinine and pyrethrum, a group of 
Swiss chemists soon found a solution to the military’s bug problem. In late 1939, 
scientists working for J.R. Geigy S.A. of Basel, Switzerland began experimenting 
with a number of chemicals to combat nuisance moth populations that were 
destroying Swiss wool supplies. During these tests, Geigy staff chemist Paul 
Müller stumbled upon a chemical first discovered by a German student during the 
late nineteenth century known as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). While 
the student never synthesized the chemical or mentioned its insect-killing 
                                                
26 Edmund P. Russell III, “The Strange Career of DDT: Experts, Federal Capacity, and 
Environmentalism World War II,” Technology and Culture 40 (1999): 6.   
27 James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press, 1968), 307.   
28 Robert G. Thobaben, ed., For Comrade and Country: Oral Histories of World War II Veterans 
(Jefferson, N.C.: MacFarland, 2003), 115.   
29 Thobaben, For Comrade and Country, 115.   
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properties, Müller felt optimistic about the chemical and began testing the 
compound in September of 1939. His tests provided clear evidence that DDT was a 
powerful insecticide. Müller found the substance had “extraordinary contact-killing 
power, as well as long duration in the out-of-doors, where the compound was 
exposed to weathering.”30 Geigy began synthesizing DDT in October of 1939 and 
the company provided the pesticide to local farmers to destroy moths and another 
nuisance bug, the Colorado potato beetle, which had been wreaking havoc on 
Swiss food supplies.31    
For the next two years, DDT remained in Switzerland fighting moths and the   
Colorado potato beetle, but, on October 16, 1942, Geigy scientists recognized the 
US’s dire need for a pyrethrum alternative and sent a six-pound DDT sample to a 
USDA lab in Orlando, Florida. Entomologists at the USDA lab began testing DDT 
as soon as the samples arrived.32 The tests, historian Edmund Russel noted, “made 
DDT look ‘magical’.”33 One scientist reported that after applying DDT powder to a 
pond, ducks in the region carried enough DDT on their bodies to kill mosquito 
larvae in adjacent ponds. Other tests provided clear evidence that DDT was 
superior to pyrethrum. After spraying a liquid variant on lab walls, scientists 
determined that the compound not only lasted four times longer than pyrethrum—
killing mosquito larvae for up to four months—but it also killed a wide variety of 
insects including moths, lice, bedbugs, flies, and cockroaches.34 Additionally, after 
the Orlando scientists determined DDT’s chemical composition, they discovered 
that the materials needed to mass produce DDT were readily available within the 
United States, which would lessen the military’s dependence on uncertain foreign 
chemical supplies.35    
There remained, however, the question of the chemical’s safety. Through 
their rigorous testing, the Orlando scientists uncovered a number of contradictory 
outcomes and had yet to determine if DDT was safe for human use. One early test 
found that large quantities of DDT produced “nervousness, convulsions, or death” 
among guinea pigs and rabbits, while a later test indicated that the chemical had no 
apparent effects on primates.36 Orlando scientists remained optimistic. Throughout 
                                                
30 John H. Perkins, “Reshaping Technology in Wartime: The Effect of Military Goals on 
Entomological Research and Insect-Control Practices,” Technology and Culture 19 (1978): 170.   
31 Paul H. Müller, “Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane and Newer Insecticides” (Nobel Lecture, 
the Nobel Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden, December 11, 1948). Accessed October 16, 2015, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1948/muller-lecture.pdf.  
32 Müller, “Dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane.” 
33 Russell, “The Strange Career of DDT,” 6. 
34 Ibid., 6.   
35 Ibid., 7.   
36 Ibid., 7.   
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the three-month test period, researchers working closely with the chemical 
displayed no adverse side effects and through their experiments with a powder 
variant, the scientists determined that little DDT absorbed into human skin. The 
tests provided no clear indication that the pesticide was entirely harmless, but with 
no alternative to pyrethrum, the Orlando lab believed DDT was the best solution 
for the military. H.O. Calvery of the FDA summarized these feelings after he 
recommended that the military adopt DDT in May of 1943. “The hazards,” Calvery 
argued, “must be weighed against the great advantages of the materials.”37 By 
December of 1943, the War Production Board felt convinced about DDT’s wartime 
use and ordered the domestic production of the chemical, providing four 
companies with permits to expand their facilities to include DDT.38    
The timing of the military’s adoption of DDT proved fortuitous for Allied 
forces. As the War Production Board finalized their plans for DDT production, a 
massive typhus outbreak in Naples, Italy, during the winter of 1943 threatened to 
wipe out the city’s entire population. When Allied forces pushed the Nazis out of 
the city, the Germans destroyed buildings, water and sewer systems, and food 
supplies as they retreated from the region. The Nazis’ destruction forced the 
Neapolitans to live in overcrowded, louse-infested bomb shelters, which served as 
the perfect vector for typhus to spread among the occupants. As the winter 
progressed, conditions grew steadily worse, and the typhus mortality rate rose to 
over seven hundred recorded deaths in the first week of January 1944 alone.39 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Allied forces in North Africa 
and Italy, recognized that typhus posed a significant threat to his operations and 
cabled Washington with a request for “seventeen tons of [DDT] concentrate.”40 By 
December 21, 1943, only two weeks after his cable, Eisenhower had received his 
supplies and the Allies began the largest delousing program in recorded history. 
Between December 21, 1943 and January 31, 1944, the Typhus Control 
Commission applied DDT powder to the clothing of over 1,300,000 citizens at two 
delousing stations in Naples.41 The results were astonishing. Within three weeks of 
                                                
37 H.O. Calvery quoted in Ibid., 7.   
38 Baxter, Scientists Against Time, 369.   
39 F.L. Soper et al. “Typhus Fever in Italy, 1943-1945, and its Control with Louse Powder,” The 
American Journal of Hygiene 45 (1947): 307-12.   
40 Stanhope Bayne-Jones memorandum of January 13, 1944, quoting secret radiogram no. W 
9560/252555 of 8 January 1944, folder "DDT Supply," box 41, USATC, quoted in Darwin H. 
Stapleton, “A Lost Chapter in Early History of DDT: The Development of Anti-Typhus 
Technologies by the Rockefeller Foundation’s Louse Laboratory, 1942-1944,” Technology and 
Culture 46 (2005): 513.   
41 O.T. Zimmerman and Irvin Lavine, DDT, Killer of Killers (Rochester, N.H.: The Record 
Press, 1946), 2.   
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the delousing program’s creation, the Allies had complete control over the typhus 
epidemic and reduced the number of recorded cases to only ten per day. The 
delousing program marked the first time that a typhus epidemic had been checked 
during the winter, all thanks to the new “miracle pesticide,” DDT.     
With the typhus epidemic averted in the European Theater and DDT’s value 
for military strategy proven, scientists began devising ways in which the 
insecticide could assist MacArthur in the Pacific. Unlike in Naples, where the army 
was mostly stationary and could use DDT powder on the clothing of civilians and 
soldiers, MacArthur’s forces in the Pacific had much more ground to cover due to 
his island-hopping strategy. While powder could help, the Pacific troops needed a 
more effective solution that could eliminate mosquito threats over larger areas 
quickly. As one Orlando researcher put it, powder was ill suited for the “highly 
mobile type of warfare” in the Pacific, so the present situation called for the 
development of new technology.42 Orlando researchers had previously worked on a 
number of technologies that would allow for mosquito control through aerial 
bombardment with pyrethrum, but the lab abandoned these projects because the 
“gallonage [of pesticides] required was so great” that it made “aerial application 
impractical.”43 DDT solved this issue. It was readily available, effective, and cost 
efficient, allowing scientists to expand the aerial program following the Naples 
epidemic. Orlando engineer Chet Husman and pilot Olin Longcoy came up with a 
number of modifications for the disbursement of DDT from military planes 
including the “Flying Flit Gun,” a mountable pesticide nozzle that could fit on 
most military aircraft.44 When the flying flit gun made its debut in the Pacific 
Theater, troops used the device liberally. From early spring 1945 until the end of 
the war, MacArthur’s forces attached the sprayer to their Avenger torpedo bombers 
and sprayed the entire islands of Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and several others in 
parts of the Philippines and Okinawa, eliminating entire mosquito populations.45 
With the ability to annihilate mosquitoes, flies, ticks, and other insects that posed a 
threat to armed forces, MacArthur’s strategy of island hopping became a bug-free 
affair. By the summer of 1945, malaria rates in the South Pacific had fallen 
                                                
42 Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, “Insecticides and Insect Repellents Developed 
for the Armed Forces at Orlando, Florida Laboratory,” Rockefeller Foundation, (1945): 22.   
43 Fred C. Bishopp, “Present Position of DDT in Control of Insects of Medical Importance,” 
American Journal of Public Health 36 (1946): 599.   
44 Gordon M. Patterson, The Mosquito Crusades: A History of the American Anti-Mosquito 
Movement from the Reed Commission to the First Earth Day (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2009), 160-161.   
45 Anthony Standen, “DDT: It will not rid the world of insect pests but it is still a wonder bug 
killer,” Life, July 8, 1946, 50; “Flying Flit-Gun Strafes Insects with DDT,” Popular Science, 
May 1945, 155.   
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significantly since the 1943 epidemic, with only twenty-five cases per one 
thousand troops for the remainder of the war.46    
Back on the home front, despite attempts to keep DDT’s existence a military 
secret, news outlets eventually caught wind of the pesticide’s wartime 
accomplishments through various leaks, and reviews for the chemical flooded into 
articles around the country.47 Reader’s Digest informed its readership that the 
army’s new miracle pesticide achieved “total victory on the insect front” in Naples 
and the South Pacific.48 An article in Life magazine extolled the benefits of DDT in 
the Pacific Theater, arguing that the military’s use of the chemical in the 
Philippines proved the insecticide “could easily convert a verminous hellhole of an 
island into a health resort.”48 The same author contended that DDT was so effective 
in North Africa that the Africans had “their first itchless night’s sleep in 
centuries.”49 A number of authors drew parallels between DDT and the great 
medical achievements of the twentieth century. Better Homes and Gardens argued 
that the “deadly new bug killer” was “as potent against insects as the sulfas and 
penicillin are against disease.”50 Similarly, an editorial in the Chicago Tribune 
contended that DDT “gives every evidence of being as miraculous a substance as 
the sulfa drugs or penicillin. It is harmless to humans and warmblooded animals, 
yet fatal to a wide variety of insects.”51    
With such rave reviews in the popular press, a number of articles speculated 
about the application of the chemical in postwar America. The author of an article 
in Popular Science from May 1945 said DDT might become the greatest consumer 
product to emerge from the war. “Picture an American home a few years after the 
war,” the author told his readers, “flies, mosquitoes, moths, and other insects die as 
fast as they sneak in.” This “sweet dream,” as the author described the imagined 
world without bugs, would soon be a reality, once “Mr. and Mrs. Postwar America 
and their family” got their hands on DDT. 52 Another article predicted that DDT 
would “send malaria mosquitoes, typhus lice and other disease-carrying insects to 
join the dodo and the dinosaur in the limbo of extinct species, thereby ending these 
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particular plagues for all time.”53 Popular Mechanics felt optimistic that DDT 
would bring about a bug-free world, but believed the postwar years would be “Our 
Next World War,” in which a “long and bitter battle to crush creeping, wriggling, 
flying, burrowing billions” would emerge.54 However, the article reassured readers 
that chemical companies would make new bug-killing technologies like the aerosol 
“bomb” widely available to consumers after the war to aid in this struggle. Even 
federal entomologists noted in 1944 that DDT had received such “wide publicity in 
popular press, over the radio, and on the screen” that the public had expectations 
that the chemical would completely annihilate pests in their “houses, gardens, and 
orchards.”55    
The pesticide companies could not have been happier about the praise for 
their product. At a meeting for the National Association of Insecticide and 
Disinfectant Manufacturers, one pesticide company executive enthusiastically 
shouted “Bugs! Bugs! Bugs! All through the war, bugs and how to kill them 
received a billion dollars’ worth of publicity— every dollar of it a mightily 
valuable sales asset to the insecticide industry.”56 A Hercules representative offered 
a similar remark when he informed the crowd of the greater demands the war 
created for pesticides among civilians. “It is only within the past war years that the 
American people have become insecticide conscious,” he noted, “and this has been 
largely due to insistence by the Army and Navy that our troops should not fall prey 
to typhus, malaria, and other insect-borne diseases.” 57  For these pesticide 
executives, there was no need to engage in massive publicity campaigns during the 
war. The media had already created demand for their product, and all these 
companies had to do was sit back, wait out the war, and prepare for the inevitable 
postwar pesticide boom.   
 
The Post-War Era 
 
When the war with Japan began to wind down in early August 1945, Americans 
gave DDT a hero’s welcome as it returned from overseas.58 Newspapers around the 
country hailed the new pesticide as the “killer of killers,” “the atomic bomb of the 
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insect world,” and “the greatest contribution to the future health of the world” to 
emerge from the war.59 Time praised the miracle chemical as one of the most 
important scientific discoveries in human history and placed images of 
MacArthur’s aerial pesticide sprayers alongside photographs of mushroom clouds 
from the first atomic bomb explosion in the New Mexico desert, demonstrating 
how equally significant the two innovations were for the Allied victory.60 The 
atomic bomb and DDT were the two technological icons of the Second World 
War, but, unlike nuclear weaponry, DDT was slated for domestic sales.    
When DDT became available to Americans in early August 1945, 
consumers throughout the country rallied around the new pesticide. Citizens who 
had been “pawing the ground in eagerness” for DDT since its debut in Naples 
purchased the pesticide in large quantities.61 By the end of 1945, DDT sales 
skyrocketed with chemical companies such as Merck reported over $61.1 million 
in domestic sales and over thirty million pounds of DDT sold to consumers and 
farmers between August and December.62 Demand for the product was so great 
that stores had difficulty keeping it in stock. Americans, a Collier’s Weekly article 
noted, are “raiding the stores for every can that shows its top above the counter.”63 
Residents of Swarthmore, Pennsylvania became so desperate to get their hands on 
DDT that they purchased counterfeit products from a local chemist, who produced 
the chemical in his cellar and sold the pesticide for $1 per pint to his neighbors. 
While some Americans bought the chemical from stores or illegal vendors, others 
sought to usher in the new age of insect warfare ceremonially. After local officials 
of Mackinac Island, Michigan sprayed the entire town with DDT, residents burned 
their old flytraps in a massive public bonfire to celebrate the extinction of pesky 
summertime flies.64 Within a few short months after its release, DDT had grabbed 
ahold of American consumers and the pesticide companies were going to make 
sure it stayed that way.   
The initial marketing strategy among pesticide companies was simply to 
continue using war imagery to sell the insecticide. The majority of DDT 
advertisements that followed the pesticide’s civilian release referenced its 
effectiveness during the war. This strategy ensured that consumers understood that 
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the product they were purchasing was the same chemical that helped win the fight 
against wartime disease and the Axis Powers. Advertisements for products like 
Industrial Management Corporation’s new DDT aerosol bug bomb, known as 
INSECT-O-BLITZ, a name used to emphasize the effectiveness of the product, 
told consumers that the product “kills moths, all mosquitoes, all gnats and other 
disease bearing flying insects THE U.S. ARMY WAY.”65 The advertisement 
guaranteed that consumers understood this was the product from the war by noting 
that INSECT-O-BLITZ contained the exact “formula used by [the] U.S. Army to 
protect men overseas.”66    
Other companies also made sure that consumers knew they were buying a 
brand that helped win the war. The Bridgeport Brass Company sold their Aer-A-
Sol one-pound bomb by emphasizing that the company had “made millions of 
these for the armed forces,” and that their product bombed “malaria mosquitoes off 
Guadalcanal,” which led to a seventy-percent drop in malaria casualties among 
Allied troops in the region.67 Television and films drove these war effort messages 
home. Sherwin Williams created a number of short films and commercials for their 
Pestroy DDT brand that played in movie theaters throughout the United States. The 
opening scene for one such commercial showed footage of soldiers spraying 
Pestroy DDT from airplanes and foggers in the Pacific, and emphasized to viewers 
that the product “had saved millions of humans” and “killed billions of insects” 
during the war.68   
Although the war provided chemical companies with an easy marketing tool, 
leaders within the pesticide industry understood that they needed to maintain 
demand for their products. They did not want the wartime urgency to kill bugs to 
die down in the months after the Pacific conflict ended. Since there were no longer 
Axis powers or “insect saboteurs” in victory gardens to serve as common enemies 
for Americans, the chemical companies devised a new foe: diseases that threatened 
the American family. Around the middle of 1946, war imagery began to disappear 
from DDT marketing in favor of advertisements that extolled the benefits of killing 
insects for the sake of preserving human health. Penn Salt Chemicals of 
Philadelphia, for example, published an advertisement in Time magazine for their 
Knox-Out DDT powder that depicted a woman, produce, and farm animals happily 
                                                
65 Industrial Management Corporation, “INSECT-O-BLITZ” Advertisement, Spokesman-Review, 
July 31, 1947, 25.   
66 Industrial Management Corporation, “INSECT-O-BLITZ,” 25.   
67 The Bridgeport Brass Company, “Aer-A-Sol ‘BOMB’ DDT Insecticide” Advertisement, The 
Bakersfield Californian, November 21, 1945, 4.   
68 Jerry Fairbanks, “Doomsday for Pests” (Sherwin-Williams Paints, 1946), MPEG video, 14:43, 
https://archive.org/details/DoomsdayForPests.   
CONCEPT, Vol. XXXIX (2016) 16 
dancing while singing, “DDT is good for me-e-e-e-!”69 Penn Salt Chemicals 
claimed that purchasing their product led to “healthier and more comfortable 
homes” because it protected families from dangerous insects like flies, mosquitoes, 
ticks, and silverfish, which the company noted did not spread disease, but were 
such common pests that they included them in the list.70 Other advertisements used 
fearmongering tactics to instill urgency in consumers and sell their products. “Do 
roaches spread cancer?” asked an advertisement for Tanglefoot spray, containing 
five-percent DDT powder, insinuating that cockroaches threatened humans and 
that eliminating them would wipe out cancer.71 Trimz DDT used a similar tactic 
against fleas, claiming that a single flea carried “6,600,000 bacteria” and that these 
germs spread typhus and polio to humans.72 
The intended audience for these advertisements was suburban women. 
Almost all of the advertisements that called for the destruction of bugs within 
homes and yards depicted suburban women wielding DDT products, spraying or 
dusting DDT around baby cribs or within the kitchen. Bison marketed its DIDIT 
spray under the phrase “The Ladies Know What’s Good!” and informed consumers 
that thousands of housewives across the country deemed their product to be the 
most effective way to kill disease-carrying insects.73 One advertisement for Fly-
Tox DDT spray featured a child peacefully sleeping in a crib with a giant fly over 
the baby’s head. The advertisement informed consumers that their “child [was] 
defenseless unless” they sprayed or dusted their nursery with DDT.74  Other 
advertisements offered more direct messages, using phrases such as “Protect your 
Children!” and “For the Sake of Your Health KILL THEM,” and contained lists of 
various disease-propagating bugs that could be easily eliminated with DDT 
products.75    
While disease served as a useful foe for a number of pesticide companies, 
other companies claimed that their products lessened the burden of the suburban 
homemaker. Like the advertisements for timesaving appliances such as blenders, 
washing machines, and microwaves, chemical companies spread the message that 
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DDT made housekeeping easier and more convenient. In a commercial for Sherwin 
William’s DDT synthetic wall coating, the narrator emphasized how much time 
homemakers could save by using their product. “Unlike sprays and fogs that irritate 
the nasal passages…and require daily applications,” the commentator states, 
Pestroy DDT “lasts week after week, month after month” and can be easily applied 
to screen doors and windows.76 DuPont Chemical printed a story in their monthly 
magazine highlighting the timesaving advantages of DDT over older pesticides 
such as pyrethrum. “The discomfort and the chore of constant spraying…belong to 
an older day,” the author contended. With DuPont’s DDT home powder, the author 
claimed, it was no longer necessary to conduct daily sprayings, as DDT’s “long-
time killing power” made the product more advantageous than older 
pesticides.77Such advertisements told their readers that DDT was not only superior 
to older pesticides, but also that its persistence in the environment offered 
timesaving solutions to busy housewives.    
Although pesticide executives were united in their adoption of marketing 
strategies toward women and against disease, they also vied against each other, 
seeking ways to make consumers purchase a given brand over its competitors. 
While only four companies held exclusive rights to DDT during the war, by 1945 
the USDA listed fourteen companies as primary DDT producers, with an additional 
261 small businesses joining the insecticide industry by 1954. This increase in the 
number of DDT producers left the companies scrambling to differentiate 
themselves.78 Additionally, a number of pesticide companies flooded the market 
with new synthetic organic pesticides, an attempt to create a more powerful 
successor to DDT. As early as 1946, Popular Science began advertising new 
pesticides such as Hexi-kol, which claimed to be four times stronger than DDT, 
and DFDT, a pesticide sold under the claim that it was as safe as DDT, yet could 
“kill houseflies better than DDT.”79    
In response to these new pesticides and the competition between DDT 
producers, pesticide companies devised a number of new technologies for their 
products, designed to set themselves apart from the competition. Since DDT was a 
versatile chemical—effective in both its powder and liquid form—companies used 
this fact to their advantage. Penn Salt Chemical developed a handful of variants for 
the chemical’s liquid form, including an invisible polyurethane coating, and listed a 
number of potential uses for the product, such as screen doors, windows, 
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doorways, cupboards, gym lockers, and pianos.80 Trimz created DDT stick-on 
wallpaper that featured Disney characters like Bambi and Mickey Mouse, designed 
for a child’s nursery.81 In 1948, a number of different companies developed DDT 
fog machines that supposedly could coat an entire yard or field ten times faster 
than application with traditional spray guns and at ten percent of the cost.82 Aside 
from new technology, another strategy to differentiate their brand was to increase 
the dosage of DDT within their products. While government standards required 
pesticide companies to have at least five-percent DDT in their products, Pestroy 
increased its formula to six-percent DDT, a marketing strategy that the company 
promised would kill bugs more effectively than their competitors. 83  While 
scientific testing during the war demonstrated that only five-percent DDT was 
required to acquire the chemical’s maximum effect, pesticides labeled with six 
percent would undoubtedly entice consumers, who would believe they were buying 
a stronger product for the same price.   
The marketing strategies that brought about new pesticide technology also 
overshadowed the growing reports from the scientific community warning about 
DDT’s potential dangers to humans and the environment. As early as August 1945, 
magazines ran stories describing the aftermath of regions sprayed with DDT. After 
the army tested DDT on a military installation in Newark, New Jersey in 1945, the 
New York Times reported that hundreds of dead fish washed up on shore due to 
DDT poisoning.84 Military scientists discovered the first case of DDT poisoning in 
a human test subject in April 1945 and argued for greater research efforts to 
determine the long-term effects of the pesticide on mammals.85 Following the 
pesticide’s release to consumers, reports describing the chemical’s dangers became 
more frequent. Popular Science published an article in 1946 entitled, “Don’t Do 
This,” arguing that, when consumed, DDT posed a severe health risk to animals 
and small children.86 The author reported that overusing DDT directly harmed 
humans and animals, as the chemical lingered in fatty tissue for extended 
durations. Overuse led to the presence of DDT in the butter and cream of farm 
animals, putting human consumers at further risk.    
Aside from the dangers to human health, frequent reports noted DDT’s 
ability to disrupt ecosystems due to the chemical’s indiscriminate killing of 
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beneficial insects. In his essay, “DDT: the Insect-Killer That Can Either Boon or 
Menace,” naturalist Edwin Way Teale offered a grim depiction of America’s 
future if consumers failed to limit their DDT use. “If insects, the good, bad, and 
indifferent insects, were wiped out in a wide area,” Teale warned, “the effects 
would be felt for generations to come.”87 He argued that killing insects, no matter 
how bothersome humans considered them to be, destroyed songbird populations 
that depended upon insects for food, as well as plants whose seeds required insects 
for pollination. Teale concluded that DDT could potentially save lives through 
controlled use, but the pesticide could also destroy entire ecosystems if its use 
went unregulated. “No drought, no flood, no hurricane could cause the widespread 
disaster that would follow in the train of the annihilation of the insects,” he 
contended.88    
For every article like Teale’s warning that DDT would upset the balance of 
nature, there were dozens more dismissing these claims as hysteria. Reader’s 
Digest called Teale’s contentions that DDT would upset the balance of nature 
“fantastic myths.”89 A DuPont representative concurred with Reader’s Digest and 
gave an interview for Fortune magazine in which he denied DDT’s dangers 
outright. “Even though there was some anti-DDT talk,” he told the magazine, 
“most of it was unfounded. There has also been a scare about the ‘balance of 
nature,’ but this is based on a fallacy: there really is no such balance.”90 The 
DuPont representative argued that if DDT was as toxic as Teale claimed, then 
federal agencies would have required a “skull and crossbones on its label.”91 
Chemical engineer OT Zimmerman did not deny the existence of a balance of 
nature, but he was adamant that DDT would actually improve America’s 
environment. In his widely read handbook on the pesticide, DDT, Killer of Killers, 
Zimmerman noted that most of the insects that DDT killed were actually invasive 
species. He contended that, in using DDT to eliminate foreign insects, like the 
infamous Japanese beetle, there was a greater “chance that it [would] be for the 
better.” 92  Zimmerman thought it was preposterous that DDT would destroy 
beneficial insects. Even if the United States paid the estimated three billion dollars 
to spray the entire continent with DDT, he argued, “We would soon find billions of 
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insect immigrants entering this country from Canada and Mexico.” 93  To 
Zimmerman, “The fear that DDT will destroy the balance of nature was 
unjustified” because insects will always migrate and reproduce quicker than the 
entire population could be eliminated.94   
The debates over DDT’s potential threats to human health and the 
environment that emerged in the wake of the Second World War eventually caught 
the attention of nature writer and Fish and Wildlife Service biologist Rachel 
Carson. Carson first spoke out against DDT in a Reader’s Digest article in 1945, 
but it was not until she received a letter from her friend Olga Owens Huckins in 
1958 that she decided to focus her efforts on denouncing the pesticide. Within her 
letter, which was later published in the Boston Herald, Huckins described to 
Carson the mass poisoning of wildlife that she witnessed after the Massachusetts 
state government conducted an aerial DDT spraying near her home. Huckins 
informed Carson that the morning after the supposedly “harmless shower bath” of 
DDT, she discovered dozens of dead songbirds scattered throughout her yard, as 
well as dead trout floating in a nearby stream. After reading Huckins’s account, 
Carson realized she needed to help put a stop to the indiscriminate spraying of 
pesticides and began collecting research on the destruction wrought by pesticides 
on the environment.95   
Carson compiled her findings into a book, Silent Spring, which became an 
instant sensation after its publication in September 1962, selling over half a million 
copies and remaining on the best-seller list for thirty-one weeks.96 The success of 
Carson’s book derived from her ability to synthesize scientific evidence about the 
dangers of overusing pesticides in clear and understandable language, allowing the 
book to appeal to the general public. One of the messages that Americans took 
away from Silent Spring was that the chemical companies’ claim that DDT would 
bring about a world without disease was a fallacy. In fact, Carson demonstrated to 
her readers that DDT actually increased the likelihood of disease among humans 
and wildlife. She warned her readers how DDT’s persistence within the 
environment allowed the chemical to enter the food chain and accumulate in the 
fatty tissues of wildlife and humans, resulting in cancer and other forms of genetic 
damage. Her opening chapter, “A Fable of Tomorrow,” depicted a nameless 
American town where DDT had “silenced” all life including fish, birds, and 
children. This introduction provided her readers with a powerful example of the 
                                                
93 Ibid.,138.   
94 Ibid., viii.   
95 Olga Owens Huckins to the Editor of the Boston Herald, January 28, 1958. Beinecke Digital 
Collections, Yale University: http://brbl-zoom.library.yale.edu/viewer/1096584.   
96 Russell, War and Nature, 222.   
CONCEPT, Vol. XXXIX (2016) 21 
pesticide’s indiscriminate destruction and allowed Americans to realize that this 
fictional setting could represent any number of towns in which DDT was used 
overzealously. Carson also criticized the link between consumerism and pesticide 
use that emerged in the postwar era:    
 
Every hardware store, garden-supply shop, and supermarket has rows of 
insecticides for every conceivable horticultural situation. Those who fail to 
make wide use of this array of lethal sprays and dusts are by implication 
remiss, for almost every newspaper’s garden page and the majority of the 
gardening magazines take their use for granted.   
  
Although it was not Carson’s intention to ban all chemical insecticides, she 
strongly believed that DDT’s enormous consumer market had placed “poisonous 
and biologically potent chemicals into the hands of persons largely or wholly 
ignorant of their potential for harm” and urged the government to place greater 
restrictions on DDT use.97   
Silent Spring marked the beginning of the end for DDT and its role in the 
war on bugs. Following the book’s publication, President John F. Kennedy, who 
felt disturbed by the excerpts he read in The New Yorker, requested that the Life 
Sciences Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee investigate 
Carson’s research. On May 15, 1963, the Committee released its report, validating 
Carson’s claims and combating the chemical industry’s vehement opposition to 
Silent Spring. The following day, a Senate Subcommittee met to discuss the 
dangers of pollution within American society, which included hearings on 
domestic pesticide regulations. In early June, the Subcommittee asked Carson to 
speak before Congress, where she urged the government to create a pesticide 
commission to regulate chemical insecticide use within the United States.98 In her 
testimony, Carson called for the end of mass aerial DDT spray campaigns and 
asserted that pesticide use violated the most basic of human rights: the “right of the 
citizen to be secure in his own home against intrusion of poisons applied by other 
persons.”99 Carson lost her battle against breast cancer less than a year after her 
testimony, but her words resonated within American society for years to come. In 
1970, the United States government established the Environmental Protection 
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Agency to oversee and regulate toxic pollutants within the United States, and two 
years later, the EPA banned most domestic uses for DDT, as well as several other 
pesticides Carson mentioned in Silent Spring and in her testimony. 100  For 
Americans in the wake of Silent Spring, the urgency to eliminate bugs with 
pesticides was displaced by an urgency to protect the environment.     
 
Conclusion 
 
When American consumers rushed to their local supermarkets and hardware stores 
in the fall of 1945, their desire to purchase the latest and greatest bug-killing 
technology was a result of the messages they received from the popular press and 
the Department of War Information throughout the Second World War. These 
messages informed Americans on both the home front and the frontlines that 
insects were no longer just minor annoyances, but enemy soldiers that were 
detrimental to the war effort and threatened the Allied victory over the Axis 
Powers. When Americans heard of a new pesticide that was supposedly non-toxic 
to humans and was winning the war against disease in the European and Pacific 
Theaters, they imagined the ways in which this new pesticide could completely 
eliminate disease in postwar America. When the war ended in the fall 1945, this 
new vision of the postwar era allowed chemical companies to market their products 
as safe and easy solutions to America’s battle against insect-borne illness. 
Chemical companies such as DuPont maintained this sense of urgency by 
employing fear-mongering marketing strategies, which further promoted the idea 
that insects were a threat to the stability of suburban life. Debates regarding DDT’s 
toxicity to humans and wildlife continued, and it was not until the publication of 
Silent Spring in 1962 that American consumers recognized the ecological disaster 
they had wrought.     
The effects of America’s war on bugs during and after the Second World 
War are still visible today. A recent study from the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service has found DDT in high concentrated volumes in the environment. Samples 
taken from sediment and groundwater in forty-one states indicate that DDT has 
persisted within the ecosystem since the chemical’s ban in 1972. Although these 
concentrations have declined steadily since the 1970s, areas with higher DDT 
residue rates demonstrate depression of eggshell thickness among birds and 
traceable amounts of DDT within the tissue of fish populations.101 Regardless, the 
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pesticide industry that boomed during the Second World War remains a 
multimillion-dollar industry. Companies like Monsanto and DuPont that made their 
fortunes during the war and postwar era still profit from pesticide sales and have 
developed a number of new insecticides and herbicides in the wake of DDT’s ban 
in 1972. These modern pesticides have allowed the war on bugs to persist since the 
1940s, and as pesticide sales continue to climb from year to year, there is no 
indication that a cease-fire will be called any time soon. As Rachel Carson warned 
in 1963, “Man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is inevitably a war 
against himself. [We are] challenged as mankind has never been challenged before 
to prove our maturity and our mastery, not of nature, but of ourselves.”102    
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